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I. Introduction
Dwayne Simonton worked for the United States Postal
Service, and when his co-workers and supervisors discovered he
was gay, they harassed him so severely that he suffered a heart
attack.1

However, the Second Circuit dismissed his suit for

sexual orientation discrimination because Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 does not provide a cause of action for sexual
orientation discrimination.2
In public employment,3 courts generally have allowed

1

See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2000)

(showing how Simonton’s co-workers and supervisors threatened
him, yelled obscenities and anti-gay epithets at him, placed
notes on the bathroom walls with his name and the names of
celebrities who had died of AIDS, and physically assaulted him).
2

See id. at 35 (rejecting Simonton’s argument that harassment

based on one’s sexual orientation is the same as discrimination
based on one’s sex); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005)
(prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
3

“Employment” refers to public employment and “employers” refers

to public employers, unless specified otherwise because victims
of sexual orientation discrimination, absent a state statutory
cause of action, must make constitutional claims, which requires

1

employers to discriminate against gay, lesbian, and bisexual
employees and applicants under the guise of a rational basis
test, without affording them protection under Title VII.4

This

seemingly contradicts the Supreme Court’s history of steadily
extending a fundamental right of privacy, which demands strict
scrutiny review by courts if the state interferes with
individuals’ intimate, sexual relations.5

The Supreme Court in

Lawrence v. Texas attempted to reconcile this contradiction by
decriminalizing private homosexual conduct and by recognizing
that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals hold a liberty interest in
their private, homosexual activities.6

However, the Court

state action.
4

See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Township H.S. Dist. 205,

391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (applying a rational basis test, which
balances the employee’s constitutional rights against the
employer’s legitimate business purposes).
5

See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505

U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (framing the Court’s obligation as defining
the liberty of all individuals, rather than mandating its own
moral code by limiting liberty to only some).
6

See 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (extending married persons’

liberty interests in their individual decisions concerning the
intimacies of their physical relationship to unmarried persons,

2

focused on homosexuals’ liberty interests in their private
homosexual conduct, rather than explicitly categorizing gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals as a suspect class.7

The Court also

refrained from explicitly defining private homosexual conduct to
be a fundamental right.8
This Comment argues that while the Lawrence Court did not
change the applicability of the rational basis test, it makes it
more difficult for employers to rationally relate their
employees’ homosexuality to legitimate business purposes, and
opens the door for future courts and legislatures to protect
homosexual employees.

Part IIA discusses the constitutional

claims that homosexual employees typically make against their
employers.9

Part IIB demonstrates how the courts use a rational

basis test to analyze these claims, which typically favors the

including homosexuals).
7

See id. (focusing on cases in which the Court has recognized a

fundamental right to privacy in individuals’ intimate sexual
relationships).
8

See id. (defining homosexual intimacy as a liberty interest,

but not as a fundamental right).
9

See infra part IIA (explaining why homosexual employees

typically make constitutional claims rather than Title VII
claims).

3

employers’ actions.10

Part IIC shows how the Supreme Court

expanded its notion of privacy rights to protect homosexual
conduct.11

Part IID examines Congress’ proposed Employment Non-

Discrimination Act of 2003 (“ENDA”), which prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees on the basis of sexual
orientation.12

Part IIIA argues that Lawrence’s holding changes

the way future courts will analyze employers’ rational basis
explanations, significantly diluting employers’ rational basis
defenses.13

10

Part IIIB advocates that the Lawrence Court opened

See infra part IIB (showing how public employers rationally

relate their adverse employment actions against their homosexual
employees to legitimate business purposes, thus escaping
liability).
11

See infra part IIC (summarizing how the Court extended

personal privacy rights to married couples, unmarried
individuals, minors, and homosexuals).
12

See infra part IID (exploring Congress’ attempt at creating

federal legislation that explicitly protects both public and
private sector employees from sexual orientation
discrimination).
13

See infra part IIIA (demonstrating how the Court’s holding in

Lawrence dictates to future courts how to apply the rational
basis test through its focus on individual privacy rights).
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the door for a future Court to recognize gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals as a suspect class, consider homosexual conduct to be
a fundamental right, and give homosexual employees’
constitutional claims heightened or strict scrutiny.14

Lastly,

Part IIIC alleges that a narrow drafting of ENDA, plus the
Court’s decision in Lawrence, should enable Congress to finally
enact ENDA.15
II. Background
A.

Homosexual Employees Generally Claim Their Employers
Violated Their Constitutional Rights

Employment relationships, absent employment contracts or
statutes that state otherwise, are generally terminable at-will
by either party.16
14

However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

See infra part IIIB (arguing that the Lawrence Court’s focus

on its prior fundamental privacy rights case law and European
jurisprudence lay the foundation for the Court, in the future,
to recognize homosexuals to be a suspect class and private
homosexual conduct to be a fundamental right).
15

See infra part IIIC (recognizing how current federal and state

legislation provide inadequate protection, how the Federal
Government is traditionally responsible in protecting its
citizens’ civil rights, and how the Lawrence decision opens the
door for such federal legislation).
16

See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 671 (West Group 1999) (1994)

5

1964 prohibits employers from discharging, refusing to hire, and
discriminating against employees with respect to compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, based on the
employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.17
While Title VII claims are the most common employment
discrimination claims that employees make, Title VII does not
expressly prohibit employers from discriminating against
employees based on the employees’ sexual orientation.18
Therefore, homosexual employees and applicants must rely on
other constitutional rights by making their claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.19
Homosexual employees often claim that their employers have
violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and

(explaining that in an at-will employment relationship, the
employer may fire the employee for any or no reason).
17

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005) (prohibiting both public

and private sector employers from engaging in the enumerated
types of discrimination).
18

See generally id. (omitting “sexual orientation” as a type of

prohibited discrimination).
19

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005) (allowing public employees to make

discrimination claims against their employers for violating
their constitutional and other statutory rights).

6

association.20

Additionally, homosexual employees often allege

that their employers violated their Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights.21
B.

Courts Analyze Homosexual Employees’ Constitutional
Claims Using A Rational Basis Test
1. First Amendment Claims

The Supreme Court established that a rational basis test
20

See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101 (1997)

(citing a lesbian job applicant’s claim that Georgia’s attorney
general violated her First Amendment rights of association when
he revoked an employment offer after finding out she publicly
claimed she was “married” to, and therefore associated with
another lesbian).
21

See, e.g., Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168-69 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (showing
how a homosexual teacher complained that his employer violated
his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection rights when it did not
renew his contract solely because he was gay); Soc’y for
Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399, 400 (N.D.
Cal. 1973), aff’d on other grounds, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1975)
(claiming that the United States Civil Service Commission
violated a homosexual supply clerk’s due process rights when the
Commission fired the clerk solely because the Commission feared
“public contempt” in employing a homosexual).
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applies to employees’ claims that employers violated their First
Amendment rights.22

This rational basis test balances the

employees’ First Amendment rights to free speech and association
against the employers’ interests in promoting legitimate
business purposes.23

While the Court did not enumerate

specifically what factors courts should weigh, it alluded to
some general considerations that might show impairment of a
governmental interest sufficient to trigger the balancing test.24
By holding employers’ views of facts, circumstances, and
predictions to a mere reasonableness standard, the Court has
granted employers substantial deference.25

22

Additionally, the

See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (requiring courts to balance

the employer’s and employee’s interests).
23

See id. (balancing a public school teacher’s interest in

commenting upon matters of public concern and a public school’s
interest in promoting workplace efficiency).
24

See id. at 569-70 (establishing the employer’s interests as

removing incompetent employees, maintaining discipline by
immediate superiors, preserving harmony among coworkers, and
maintaining personal loyalty and confidence when necessary to a
particular working relationship).
25

See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673-81 (1994) (applying

a reasonableness standard to a manager’s investigation of the

8

Court has granted a wide degree of deference to employers’
judgments when their employees have close working relationships
essential to fulfilling public responsibilities.26

The Court has

also granted greater significance to the government’s interests
when it acts as an employer rather than as a sovereign.27

The

courts have generally granted employers great deference, denying
homosexual employees’ First Amendment claims when their
employers rationally alleged that employing homosexual employees
would affect the employers’ public credibility, interfere with
the employers’ abilities to handle controversial matters, appear
to conflict with states’ sodomy laws, create difficulties
maintaining supportive working relationships, present conflicts
of interest in prosecuting homosexual-related crimes, and

facts that led him to fire the employee).
26

See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983) (noting that

the close working relationship involved in a district attorney’s
office granted the employer a wide degree of deference).
27

See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (finding that when the government

acts in its capacity as an employer, its interests in
effectively and efficiently achieving its goals are greater than
when the government acts as sovereign because the Framers of the
Constitution intended the First Amendment to protect citizens
from the government, not employees from their employer).

9

present a contrary image to community values.28
2. Equal Protection And Substantive Due Process Claims
The courts have applied the same rational basis test to
analyze homosexual employees’ claims that their employers
violated their Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
rights.29

28

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

See, e.g., Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (allowing Georgia’s

Attorney General to revoke an employment offer to a lesbian
attorney, legitimizing his concerns about workplace unity,
public credibility, and the attorney’s questionable commitment
to upholding the state’s sodomy laws); Childers v. Dallas Police
Dep’t, 513 F. Supp. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (noting that an
employer could discharge a homosexual employee because employing
him would undermine the police department’s legitimate needs for
obedience and discipline, could damage the department’s public
image, and could interfere with the homosexual officer’s duties
to handle evidence of offenses involving homosexual conduct);
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 491 F.2d 498, 499 (4th Cir. 1974)
(claiming that a public school teacher’s public interviews about
his homosexuality would substantially disrupt his ability to
effectively teach).
29

See Glover, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (applying a rational basis

test to a homosexual teacher’s claim that his employer violated
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Amendment requires public employers to treat all similarly
situated employees alike.30

When employers treat similarly

situated employees differently, courts determine whether the
employment action deserves strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny,
or rational basis scrutiny, depending on if the employee is part
of a suspect class, quasi-suspect class, or non-suspect class,
respectively.31
The Supreme Court defined a suspect class as one that
deserves extraordinary protection from the majority because a
history of purposeful unequal treatment has disabled it, and the
class is in a position of political powerlessness.32

The Court

his Equal Protection rights when it failed to renew his contract
after discovering he was gay).
30

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating that no State shall

“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws").
31

See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance

Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (declaring
homosexuals to be a non-suspect class because homosexuality is a
behavior and not an immutable characteristic).
32

See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)

(finding that a large, diverse, amorphous class, unified only by
the fact that they live in a district with a lower tax base,
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has also focused on the immutability of the group’s identifying
trait when determining if someone is part of a suspect class.33
However, the Supreme Court has recognized only three
classifications as suspect: race,34 alienage,35 and national
origin.36
class.37

The Court has recognized gender as a quasi-suspect
Most courts have not considered homosexuals to be a

does not exhibit suspect class characteristics).
33

See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)

(recognizing sex, race, and national origin as immutable
characteristics because they are determined solely by birth).
34

See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (finding that Virginia’s

miscegenation statute banning interracial marriage was not
necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest).
35

See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (declaring

alienage as an inherently suspect class, subject to strict
judicial scrutiny).

But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72-

75 (1979) (recognizing scenarios where discrimination based on
alienage did not demand strict scrutiny).
36

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)

(finding that an order excluding all persons of Japanese
ancestry from an area drew strict scrutiny).
37

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (reaffirming that

classifications based on gender must be substantially related to
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suspect class because they consider homosexuality to be
behavioral and not an immutable characteristic.38

Because the

serving important governmental objectives for a court to render
a classification constitutional).
38

See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895

F.2d 563, 573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (comparing homosexuality to
race, gender, and national origin, which are suspect classes
whose conduct is irrelevant to their identifications).

But see

Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997),
rev’d on other grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998) (granting
homosexuals heightened scrutiny because of historic prejudice
against homosexuals as a minority group that makes it difficult
to protect them politically).

The court also noted how sexual

orientation forms a significant part of a person’s identity and
is resistant to change or treatment, despite widespread
discrimination and social pressure against homosexuals.

Id.;

Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 446 (Or.
Ct. App. 1998) (changing the court’s focus of suspect class
definition from the immutability of the characteristic to the
fact that societies have historically regarded such
characteristics as defining distinct groups that have faced
adverse social or political stereotyping or prejudice).

Also,

the court recognized that individuals may change other suspect

13

Supreme Court has yet to recognize homosexuals as a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, employers must merely rationally relate
their employment decisions based on sexual orientation
classifications to a legitimate business purpose.39

Regardless

of the level of scrutiny, employers only violate the Equal
Protection Clause when they intentionally and purposefully
discriminate.40

The courts have typically denied homosexual

employees’ Equal Protection claims where employers rationally
claimed that employing homosexual employees would jeopardize the
employers’ security, legitimacy, efficiency, workplace obedience
and discipline and the employers needed to protect their public

class characteristics at will, such as alienage and religious
affiliation.
39

Id.

See Glover, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1169 (ruling that a rational

basis test applies to a homosexual teacher’s claim that his
employer violated his Equal Protection rights when it failed to
renew his contract, but renewed a contract of a similarly
situated heterosexual employee).
40

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (stating

that the employees must show more than a disparate impact to
demonstrate the employer violated their Equal Protection
rights).
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images and avoid ridicule and embarrassment.41
For Substantive Due Process claims, courts require that
employers’ adverse employment actions pass strict scrutiny, if
they have interfered with employees’ fundamental rights.42

While

the Supreme Court has extended a fundamental right to privacy to
protect individuals’ private, sexual relations, the Supreme

41

See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 104 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (agreeing that the FBI’s hiring of a homosexual agent
would undermine the Bureau’s law enforcement credibility and
pose a security risk); Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1324 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (finding that the government’s security interest in
collecting foreign intelligence and protecting the nation’s
secrets justified its discharge of a homosexual federal
intelligence agent); Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 146-47 (stating
that the government’s interest in maintaining department
discipline and the government’s concern about the homosexual
employee’s ability to gain the trust and respect of co-workers
outweighed the employee’s interest in constitutional protection
for his homosexual behavior).
42

See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)

(finding that the government cannot interfere with married
couples’ fundamental rights to privacy in their marital
relationships).
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Court has never expressly declared private, consensual
homosexual conduct to be part of one’s fundamental right to
privacy, and thus courts routinely deny homosexual employees’
Substantive Due Process claims under a rational basis test.43
C.

The Supreme Court Extended Its Notion Of An
Individual’s Right To Privacy To Protect Private
Homosexual Conduct

While the courts primarily used a rational basis test to
decide whether employers discriminated against employees based
on the employees’ sexual orientations, the Supreme Court
expanded its view on a homosexual’s right to privacy in Lawrence
v. Texas.44

The case grew from a steady line of Supreme Court

cases that extended privacy rights to individuals engaged in
certain intimate, private behaviors.45

43

See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 146-147 (denying a

homosexual police officer’s Substantive Due Process claim where
the police department fired the officer, finding that the
department acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously, but
rather rationally related the employment action to legitimate
employment concerns).
44

See 539 U.S. at 578 (finding that Texas had no legitimate

state interest to justify invading homosexuals’ private lives
via its criminal sodomy statute).
45

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (including a

16

First, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a
state law that prohibited married couples’ use of drugs or
contraception devices and counseling or aiding and abetting the
use of contraceptives.46

The Court described the protected

interest as a right to privacy and placed emphasis on the
marital relationship.47
The Court next extended the right to privacy it granted in
Griswold beyond the marital relationship by invalidating a law
that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons.48

The Court stressed that the law impaired the exercise

woman’s right to have an abortion in a guaranteed zone of
privacy).

But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)

(denying homosexuals’ privacy rights to their private,
homosexual conduct by upholding Georgia’s criminal sodomy
statute).
46

See 381 U.S. at 485 (finding that the law invaded the privacy

of the marital relationship).
47

See id. (emphasizing the marital bedroom as a protected,

private space).
48

See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972)

(recognizing that unmarried persons enjoyed the same right to
privacy as married persons).
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of personal rights.49
Next, the Court expanded a woman’s right to privacy, under
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to include having
an abortion.50

Again, the Court recognized a more general right

to privacy rather than enumerating specific areas in which one
can expect privacy.51
The Court then extended to minors certain privacy rights it
had already granted to adults.52

The Court invalidated a New

York law forbidding the sale or distribution of contraceptive
devices to persons under sixteen years old.53

49

The combination of

See id. at 443, 448 (holding that the statute violated the

rights of single persons and that the statute’s purpose of
deterring premarital sex was not legitimate).
50

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (concluding that the government may

not prevent a woman from having an abortion, except for certain
enumerated circumstances where the state has compelling
interests).
51

See id. at 152 (describing the privacy interest as an

individual’s “zone of privacy”).
52

See Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 693

(1977) (extending to minors the right to privacy in connection
with decisions affecting procreation).
53

See id. at 694 (finding that minors have the same right to
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Eisenstadt, Roe, and Carey acted to extend privacy rights beyond
married adults.
However, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court took an anomalous
step and upheld Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute.54

The Court’s

analysis focused on the United States’ history of condemning
homosexual conduct.55

The Court also found no connection between

homosexual conduct and other fundamental rights that the Court
had recognized in previous decisions.56

Following this purported

history and lack of connection, the Bowers Court held that
homosexuals did not have a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual activity.57

privacy as adults regarding procreation).
54

See 478 U.S. at 196 (allowing the state to impose on

homosexuals its moral disapproval of homosexual conduct).
55

See id. at 192-94 (focusing on the frequency of criminal

sodomy statutes in effect when the states ratified the Bill of
Rights as well as when Congress enacted the Fourteenth
Amendment).
56

See id. at 191 (noting no connection between the personal

rights of family, marriage, and procreation to homosexuality).
57

See id. at 192-94 (reasoning that a fundamental right is one

that is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition).
Because this Nation historically has proscribed homosexual

19

Ten years later, in Romer v. Evans, the Court invalidated
an amendment to Colorado’s Constitution that prohibited all
legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect
homosexual persons from discrimination.58

The Court stated that

class-based legislation, legislation that imposes a disability
on a single named group, was invalid.59
Finally, the Court relied on these cases when it decided,
in Lawrence v. Texas, to strike down Texas’ criminal sodomy
statute and overrule Bowers.60

For the first time, the Court

recognized that homosexuals held a right to privacy in their
private, consensual homosexual activities under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61

The Lawrence Court focused

conduct, the Court was unwilling to declare it a fundamental
right.
58

Id.

See 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (stating that Colorado’s

Amendment was based on pure animus and bigotry).
59

See id. at 634 (recognizing that animosity toward the class of

persons affected cannot be a legitimate governmental interest).
60

See 539 U.S. at 577-78 (finding that society’s standards of

morality cannot be a rational basis for condemning what it views
to be an immoral practice).
61

See id. (analogizing homosexuals’ liberty interests in their

private, consensual, homosexual conduct to married and non-

20

on the demeaning effects criminal sodomy statutes created,
regardless of whether or not the state actually enforced them,
when applicable against private, consenting, homosexual adults.62
Additionally, the Lawrence Court rebutted its Bowers analysis of
this Nation’s history of condemning homosexual conduct.63
Instead, the Lawrence Court recognized that states created early
sodomy laws in order to prohibit non-procreative sexual
activity.64

Moreover, the Lawrence Court noted that early state

sodomy laws acted as a catch-all to prosecute sexual predators

married persons’ liberty interests in their individual decisions
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationships).
62

See id. at 575-76 (recognizing that criminal offenses impose

stigmas on convicts, which range from recording convictions on
one’s history of criminal convictions, subjecting convicts to
the registration laws of at least four states, and noting
convictions on job application forms).
63

See id. at 568 (refuting the notion that this country has a

longstanding history of criminalizing homosexual conduct as
opposed to sodomy).
64

See id. (explaining that the states’ early criminal sodomy

laws did not focus on homosexuals as a distinct class for
enforcement).
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whose actions did not fall into the category of rape.65
The Lawrence Court justified declaring criminal sodomy statutes
unconstitutional by focusing on the Court’s more recent history
of extending the sphere of privacy rights; ultimately including
private, consensual, homosexual activity in that sphere.66
However, the Court stopped short of recognizing gays, lesbians,
and bisexuals as a suspect class or their private homosexual
conduct as a fundamental right.67
D.

Congress’ Attempts To Enact The Employment NonDiscrimination Act

In 2003, Congress, recognizing the problem of sexual
orientation discrimination in employment, reintroduced ENDA,
which prohibits employers from discharging, refusing to hire,
and discriminating against employees with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

65

See id. at 569 (noting that states mainly enforced state

sodomy laws against predatory sexual acts of an adult man
against a child, rather than against consenting adults).
66

See id. at 571-72 (demonstrating the Court’s more recent trend

of granting liberty rights that protect adults’ decisions about
private matters pertaining to sex).
67

See id. (reserving judgment on whether to grant homosexuals

heightened scrutiny).
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based on the employee’s sexual orientation.68

Congress first

introduced ENDA in 1994, but has failed to enact ENDA since its
original proposition.69

In 1996, the last time ENDA came to a

vote, the Senate rejected it.70
III. Analysis
A.

The Court’s Analysis In Lawrence Forces Future Courts
To Question The Reasonableness Of The Employers’
Traditional Rational Bases

At one end of the spectrum, states can no longer condemn
private, consensual, homosexual conduct as criminal activity.71
However, at the other end of the spectrum, the Lawrence Court

68

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 4 (2003) (stating ENDA’s purposes as providing federal
protection and remedies against employment discrimination based
on sexual orientation).
69

See Price Waterhouse, Sex Stereotyping, and Gender Non-

Conformity Bias, THE U.S. LAW WEEK, Oct. 19, 2004, at 2211 n.7
(demonstrating how Congress has rejected ENDA seven times since
it first introduced ENDA in 1994).
70

See 142 CONG.REC. D912-02 (1996) (showing how the Senate

rejected ENDA by one vote).
71

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (decriminalizing homosexual

activity because one’s homosexuality is a private liberty
interest).
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did not explicitly declare homosexuals to be a suspect class of
citizenry, worthy of strict scrutiny, nor did the Court
recognize their private, consensual, homosexual conduct to be a
fundamental right.72

The Court, thus, has to determine where to

place homosexual activity on their analytical spectrum.
While the Court in Lawrence did not change the
applicability of the rational basis test, its focus will cause
future courts to question the reasonableness of employers’
rational bases for their adverse employment actions against
their homosexual employees.73

In declaring criminal sodomy

statutes unconstitutional, the Court attempted to overcome the
stigma it recognized criminal sodomy laws created.74

72

Under the

See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the

Lawrence majority does not explicitly recognize homosexuals as a
suspect class and does not expressly consider homosexual conduct
a fundamental right, but rather ambiguously declares homosexual
conduct to be a liberty interest without further definition).
73

See Waters, 511 U.S. at 675-76 (showing the Court’s

willingness to grant greater deference to employers’ rationales
when employers merely prove that their rationales are
reasonable).
74

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-76 (focusing on how homosexuals

convicted of sex crimes must disclose convictions on job
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Court’s reasoning in Bowers, the courts generally found
employers’ rationales reasonably related to legitimate business
purposes because the employers’ legitimate business purposes
reflected the Court’s recognition of society’s moral and
criminal condemnation of homosexual activity.75

After Lawrence,

the courts must apply the rational basis test such that the
employers’ legitimate business purposes reflect the Court’s
recognition of homosexuals’ liberty interests in their own
private, consensual, homosexual activity.76

More specifically,

Lawrence significantly dilutes the employers’ traditional
rational basis defenses by forcing future courts to question the
reasonableness of employers’ claims that homosexual employees
are not fit for employment because they are engaged in criminal
activity, and that hiring homosexual employees destroys

applications and are subject to some states’ registration laws).
75

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (declaring that society’s moral

judgment of homosexual activity is rationally related to
condemning such activity as criminal).
76

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (stating that society’s moral

judgment of homosexual activity cannot justify condemning such
activity as criminal and override homosexuals’ individual
liberty rights in their private, consensual, homosexual
activity).
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workplace unity, is contrary to the employers’ public images and
credibility, and poses risks to national security.
1. Criminality
The Lawrence decision eliminates employers’ common tactic
of claiming that homosexual employees are engaged in criminal
activity and therefore unfit for employment.77

By extending

constitutional protections to homosexual conduct, the Lawrence
decision stops employers from facially discriminating against
their homosexual employees simply due to their employees’
private homosexual conduct because employers cannot condition
employment on the relinquishment of a legal right.78
For example, applying the argument to the field of law
enforcement, employers cannot reasonably question homosexual
employees’ commitments to upholding and enforcing state sodomy

77

See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 142 (showing a pre-

Lawrence case where a police department claimed that a
homosexual officer was unfit for service because the officer had
engaged in criminal activity, namely homosexual sodomy).
78

See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)

(noting that although the Constitution does not guarantee public
employment, conditioning employment on the relinquishment of
one’s First Amendment rights would undermine one’s
constitutional freedoms of speech and association).
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laws because the Court in Lawrence declared the laws
unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable.79

Prior to

Lawrence, courts gave credence to employers’ concerns about
hiring homosexual law enforcement officers, finding that the
officers had an inherent conflict of interest with enforcing
homosexual sodomy crimes that they themselves violated.80

The

Lawrence decision, however distinguished private, consensual,
homosexual conduct from other valid criminal sodomy laws,
therefore calling into question employers’ concerns about
homosexual officers’ commitments to enforcing valid homosexual
sodomy crimes.81

79

By decriminalizing private, consensual,

See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (demonstrating a pre-Lawrence

case in which the court decided that the Attorney General could
reasonably believe that hiring a lesbian attorney would inhibit
his office from prosecuting Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute).
80

See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 137 (demonstrating a pre-

Lawrence case that gave deference to a police department’s
concern that hiring a homosexual officer for its property
division would jeopardize the evidence’s authenticity because
the officer had an inherent conflict of interest in preserving
evidence of a homosexual crime).
81

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (narrowing the Lawrence Court’s

holding so that criminal sodomy laws aimed at protecting minors,
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homosexual conduct, the Lawrence Court eliminated homosexual law
enforcement officers’ conflicts of interest as well as the
employers’ rational bases for denying employment, because the
officers will no longer enforce the invalid laws that they
previously violated.82
The Lawrence Court did uphold the validity of certain
criminal sodomy laws, and employers might still claim that
homosexual law enforcement officers have a conflict of interest
in enforcing these remaining valid laws.83

However, these claims

will likely fail in the same way as a police department’s claim
that a female law enforcement officer presents a conflict of
interest in enforcing prostitution laws.

Homosexual law

protecting persons whom the conduct would injure or coerce,
prohibiting non-consensual relationships, and prohibiting public
conduct or prostitution remained valid, as well as holding that
the government does not have to recognize homosexual
relationships).
82

See id. (finding that the state cannot criminalize private

sexual conduct).
83

See, e.g., Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 137 (noting a pre-

Lawrence case that legitimized a police department’s concern
that a homosexual officer might destroy homosexual mail order
materials or tip off homosexual groups about police raids).
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enforcement officers, who engage solely in constitutionally
protected, private, consensual, homosexual activity, do not have
a conflict of interest in enforcing valid criminal laws, which
their conduct does not violate.84
The Lawrence holding also vastly affects how courts will
apply state statutes that allow public schools to fire
homosexual teachers for engaging in immoral or criminal
conduct.85

For example, a public school in Alaska merely had to

show sufficient evidence that a homosexual teacher committed a
crime of moral turpitude in order to dismiss the teacher.86

84

See id. at 137-38 (disclosing how a homosexual officer

belonged to a Christian church with a special outreach to the
gay community, had marched in two Gay Pride Parades, and had
participated in picketing to protest a television program that
portrayed homosexual males as child molesters, but was not part
of a homosexual or male prostitution group).
85

See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.170(a)(2)(2004) (defining

immorality as “the commission of an act that, under the laws of
the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude”).
86

See Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 691 P.2d

1034, 1040 (Alaska 1984) (stating that a public school may fire
a teacher for engaging in a crime of moral turpitude, even when
the state has not convicted the teacher).
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Lawrence makes it more difficult for a school to dismiss the
teacher whether the school considers homosexuality to be a crime
in the traditional sense or figuratively.

First, by removing

the criminality of homosexual sodomy, Lawrence makes it more
difficult for a public school to show any evidence that a
teacher who engaged in private, consensual homosexual conduct
was therefore engaged in a crime of moral turpitude.87

Further,

even if the definition of immorality did not require that
teachers commit a criminal act of moral turpitude before a
school could fire them, but rather just required a school to
make moral judgments based on community standards, Lawrence
requires public schools to protect homosexual teachers’ liberty
rights instead of imposing society’s moral values on teachers’
homosexual conduct.88

87

By removing the criminality of homosexual

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that the state may not

demean homosexuals’ existence by criminalizing their private
sexual conduct).
88

See Ross v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 641 P.2d 600, 608

(Or. Ct. App. 1982) review allowed, 648 P.2d 852 (Or. 1982),
rev’d on other grounds, 657 P.2d 188 (Or. 1982) (demonstrating a
pre-Lawrence case, which held that a public school properly
discharged a teacher because the public nature of the teacher’s
homosexual conduct was immoral, not necessarily the conduct
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activity, the Court in Lawrence removed a major weapon from the
employer’s arsenal.
2. Workplace Unity
Lawrence also forces the courts to question employers’
claims that employing homosexual employees will disrupt
workplace unity.89

Again, using law enforcement as an example,

when the Court decriminalized homosexual conduct, it removed the
only legitimate, actionable source of tension between employees,
namely having to decide whether or not to arrest and prosecute
their homosexual colleagues for engaging in the criminal conduct
of homosexual sodomy.90

The Lawrence decision prohibits

employers from acting on any remaining sources of tension
between employees and their homosexual colleagues, such as
individual employee disagreements about the morality of
homosexual conduct, because under Lawrence employers must

itself).
89

See, e.g., Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing staff

cohesiveness as a legitimate business concern).
90

See Endsley v. Naes, 673 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D. Kan. 1987)

(holding that the police department legitimately fired a
homosexual police officer in order to maintain close working
relationships both internally and externally with the
community).
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preserve homosexual employees’ liberty rights over imposing
other employees’ moral judgments of homosexuality.91

Likewise,

employers cannot forbid homosexual employees from engaging in
private, consensual homosexual conduct, just to avoid workplace
conflict, in the same way that employers cannot forbid employees
to advocate religion in the workplace, even though that may
cause workplace tension as well.92

While courts recognize

employers’ strong interests in avoiding tension in the
workplace, Lawrence does not allow the employer to trump
homosexual employees’ rights to engage in homosexual conduct
simply to bolster workplace unity.93

91

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding that imposing society’s

moral judgment on homosexuals is not a legitimate interest to
criminalize homosexual conduct).
92

See Tucker v. California Dept. of Educ., 97 F.3d 1204, 1211

(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the employer’s ban on religious
advocacy in the workplace was not necessary to further the
employer’s interest in workplace efficiency and discipline).
93

See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (demonstrating a pre-Lawrence

case in which the employer claimed that employing a lesbian
attorney would create difficulties in maintaining working
relationships in Georgia’s Attorney General’s office).
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3. Public Image And Credibility
By declaring criminal sodomy statutes unconstitutional, the
Lawrence Court removed the types of criticisms that employers
alleged society would make as a result of employing homosexual
employees.

Again, using the field of law enforcement as an

example, Lawrence causes future courts to question employers’
concerns about the public credibility of their offices because
society will not look poorly upon an employer for hiring
employees that do no not uphold and enforce unconstitutional
laws.94

Moreover, the Lawrence decision makes society’s views of

an office’s credibility irrelevant with respect to hiring
homosexual employees that society deems are engaged in immoral
conduct.95

94

Because the Court in Lawrence reasoned that society

See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (showing a pre-Lawrence case in

which the court found that the Georgia Attorney General could
reasonably conclude that hiring a lesbian attorney would
undermine the office’s public credibility because a lesbian
attorney might be unwilling to enforce the state’s criminal
sodomy laws).
95

See id. (demonstrating a pre-Lawrence case where the court

upheld the employer’s reasoning that hiring a lesbian attorney
would send a signal to society that the Attorney General’s
Office was hypocritical to the Office’s prior stance of
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cannot criminalize conduct it finds to be immoral, employers
cannot impose society’s moral judgments of homosexuality on
their homosexual employees as that would be tantamount to the
state imposing society’s morality in criminalizing homosexual
conduct.96
Moreover, the Lawrence decision changes the employers’
public messages and images that they must project.97

For

example, under the Bowers’ rationale, law enforcement employers
denied employment to homosexuals under the guise that this
denial was necessary to reflect society’s moral condemnation of
homosexual activity.98

The Lawrence Court eliminated this

rationale by rejecting the premise that the state can
criminalize homosexual conduct as a reflection of society’s

upholding Georgia’s criminal sodomy statute).
96

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (finding that society’s

morals do not justify criminalizing one’s private conduct).
97

See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101 (recognizing the legitimacy of

the Georgia Attorney General’s concern about his office
appearing conflicted about interpretations of Georgia law if he
hired a lesbian attorney).
98

See Childers, 513 F. Supp. at 140-41 (recognizing a strong

state interest in its police department reflecting a majority of
society’s values).
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values.99

Lawrence stands for the reasoning that employers must

uphold their homosexual employees’ liberty rights, through their
public messages and images, even at the risk of conflicting with
society’s moral condemnation of their employees’ homosexual
conduct.100
4. National Security Risks
The Court’s Lawrence decision also forecloses the return of
sexual orientation discrimination based on the government’s
national security concerns.101

The government’s original concern

was that Communists, or other anti-American groups, would
blackmail homosexual government employees by threatening to
expose the employees’ homosexuality in order to gain access to
confidential materials.102

99

As a result, the government subjected

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding that reflecting

society’s values is not a legitimate government interest to
sustain a state’s criminal sodomy statute).
100

See id. (stating that the government may not interfere with

homosexuals’ personal liberty, simply because a majority of
society morally condemns homosexual conduct).
101

See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575-76 (validating the

Government’s concern that hiring homosexual employees would
compromise the Government’s confidential material).
102

See David K. Johnson, Homosexual Citizens: Washington’s Gay
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homosexual employees to much more rigorous background checks
than their heterosexual colleagues.103

The courts found this

rationale reasonable under the Court’s decision in Bowers,
because homosexual employees feared exposing their homosexuality
where it would likely lead to loss of employment and possible
criminal prosecution.104

However, the Court’s decision in

Community Confronts the Civil Service, WASH. HIST., Fall/Winter
1994-95, at 54 (explaining that the United States Civil Service
did not necessarily doubt homosexual employees’ loyalties, but
rather was concerned that homosexuals were at greater risk to
blackmail and therefore posed a security risk).
103

See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575-76 (upholding

extensive background checks for homosexual employees on the
grounds that they are rationally related to protecting the
government’s legitimate security interests because homosexual
employees present a greater risk for blackmail and coercion).
104

See Johnson, supra note 102, at 53-54 (demonstrating how

federal employees reasonably feared losing their jobs once
Congress raised a suspicion of their individual homosexuality).
But see Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug. 7,
1995) (prohibiting the government from discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation when granting security clearances by
ending the government’s practice of subjecting homosexual
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Lawrence causes the courts to question this rationale’s
reasonableness because under Lawrence, homosexual employees no
longer fear criminal prosecution of their private, homosexual
conduct.105
The Lawrence Court’s decision also diminishes the
government’s national security concerns through its focus on the
Model Penal Code and the greater social stigma that criminal
sodomy statutes had imposed on homosexuals.106

The Model Penal

Code recognized the potential for individuals to blackmail
homosexual government employees, and specifically cited that

applicants for clearances to an extensive background
investigation on that basis alone).
105

See Padula, 822 F.2d at 104 (exemplifying a pre-Lawrence case

in which the court upheld the FBI’s decision not to hire a
homosexual agent because it would pose a security risk); Doe,
981 F.2d at 1324 (showing a pre-Lawrence case where the court
found that a homosexual federal intelligence agent infringed on
the government’s security interest in collecting foreign
intelligence and protecting the nation’s secrets).
106

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572, 575 (noting how the Model

Penal Code’s recommendation and the stigma that criminal sodomy
statutes created infringed on homosexuals’ liberty interests in
their private, consensual, homosexual activities).
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potential as one of its reasons for not recommending criminal
sodomy statutes against private, consenting adults.107

By

recognizing the Model Penal Code’s recommendation and by
focusing on the stigma attached to criminal sodomy statutes, the
Lawrence Court’s decision to overrule the criminal sodomy
statutes as the major cause of the blackmail and social stigma
signaled the Court’s attempt at overcoming these evils.108

By

removing the possibility of criminal sanctions, the Court
removed the effectiveness of attempting to blackmail homosexual
employees because in addition to not fearing criminal
prosecution, homosexual employees will not feel the same
pressure of facing the added social stigma that criminal
sanctions would impose if one exposed the homosexual employee’s

107

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 372 (1980) (justifying

its recommendation because criminal sodomy statutes 1) penalize
conduct that many people engage in, which undermines respect for
the law; 2) punish people for their private actions that do not
harm others; and 3) invite the danger of blackmail when the
courts arbitrarily enforce them).
108

See id. at 578 (stating that the state cannot demean

homosexuals’ existence or control their destiny by criminalizing
their private sexual conduct).
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sexual orientation to the public.109

The Court’s decision in

Lawrence minimized both the incentive and potential for
blackmail, thus questioning employers’ national security
concerns.110
B.

The Lawrence Decision Opened The Door For A Future
Court To Declare Homosexuals To Be A Suspect Class, And
Private, Homosexual Conduct To Be A Fundamental Right

The Court, by declaring gays, lesbians, and bisexuals to be
a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and by declaring private,
homosexual conduct to be a fundamental right, would provide
homosexual employees with greater protection than under a
rational basis test because it would require employers to meet
the higher standard of at least substantially relating their
employment decisions to important business purposes, rather than
just rationally relating employment decisions to legitimate

109

See Richardson v. Hampton, 345 F. Supp. 600, 609 (D.D.C.

1972) (citing a pre-Lawrence case that found that the government
may question a homosexual employee’s background extensively out
of a legitimate concern in maintaining the security of
classified information and the Civil Service’s overall
efficiency).
110

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (noticing the potential for

blackmail when homosexual employees’ private homosexual conduct
is criminalized).
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business purposes.111

While the majority in Lawrence did not

explicitly declare homosexual a suspect class and did not
explicitly grant homosexual conduct fundamental right status,
the opinion’s reasoning focused on case law whose principles
favor such findings.112

Additionally, the Court focused on

European jurisprudence that applied strict scrutiny to
government actions against private, consensual homosexual
conduct in the same manner that the United States Supreme Court
has treated other fundamental rights, such as individuals’
rights to privacy in their private, intimate conduct.113

111

Cf. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150

(1980) (applying intermediate level scrutiny to gender-based
discrimination, gender being a quasi-suspect class, and
requiring the discriminatory action to be substantially related
to important governmental objectives).
112

See 539 U.S. at 572-73 (focusing on cases, such as Griswold,

Eisenstadt, and Carey, which have declared individuals’ privacy
rights in matters pertaining to sex fundamental rights).
113

Compare Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 489

(accepting homosexuality as an integral part of human freedom
and holding that government actions had to be ‘necessary’
towards achieving compelling government interests) with
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443, 448 (invalidating a state law that
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1. Creating A Fundamental Right To Privacy
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, focusing on how Texas’
criminal sodomy statute did not pass a rational basis test under
the Equal Protection Clause, likely forced the majority to stop
short of explicitly finding private, consensual homosexual
conduct to be a fundamental right at the risk of losing her
support.114

Justice O’Connor joined in the Bowers majority,

which declared that homosexual conduct was not a fundamental
right.115

Therefore, if the Lawrence majority explicitly

prohibited the sale of contraceptives to non-married individuals
because it invaded individuals’ fundamental rights to privacy in
their private, sexual conduct and was not a necessary
restriction aimed at achieving a compelling government
interest).
114

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(basing her conclusion on the Equal Protection Clause rather
than contradicting the Bowers majority by declaring homosexual
conduct a fundamental right).
115

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95 (demonstrating the Court’s

reluctance to expand its definition of a fundamental right to
include homosexual conduct because of the Court’s belief that
doing so would be exercising judge-made constitutional law,
bringing the Court closer to illegitimacy).
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declared homosexual conduct to be a fundamental right, Justice
O’Connor could not have supported the Lawrence majority because
she would have been forced to overrule her prior decision in
Bowers.116

However, the majority’s focus is more consistent with

the Court’s jurisprudential direction of expanding fundamental
privacy rights to individuals’ private, sexual conduct.117
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized marriage as one
of the “basic civil rights of man.”118

If marriage is such an

important interest, then as an integral part of marriage,
couples’ private, intimate conduct should be accorded the same
weight.119

116

The Court in Lawrence rationalized overturning state

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring)

(writing that the Justice joined the Bowers majority and was
unwilling to join the Lawrence plurality in overruling it).
117

See, e.g., Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55 (extending a

fundamental right to privacy to cover unmarried couples’
interests in their private, intimate conduct).
118

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (applying strict scrutiny to

Virginia’s miscegenation law, which prohibited interracial
marriage).
119

See Brief of Amici Curiae American Psychological Association

et al. at 15-23, Lawrence V. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (stating
that sexual intimacy is a fundamental aspect of human
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sodomy laws because it recognized that partners’ intimate sexual
relations are an important privacy interest.120

By focusing on

privacy rights rather than an Equal Protection analysis, the
Court paved the foundation for a future Court to explicitly
declare that private, homosexual conduct is a fundamental right,
consistent with other fundamental privacy rights that the Court
has granted.121
The Lawrence Court’s focus on European jurisprudence to
impeach its previous findings in Bowers implicitly supports a

experience); see also P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, AMERICAN COUPLES:
MONEY, WORK, SEX 193, 201, 205-06 (1983) (saying that, “[A] good
sex life is central to a good overall relationship”).
120

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (finding that homosexual

persons’ intimate conduct can simply be but one element of a
more enduring relationship).
121

See Bobbie L. Stratton, A Prediction Of The United States

Supreme Court’s Analysis Of The Defense Of Marriage Act, After
Lawrence v. Texas, 46 S.TEX.L.REV. 361, 388 (arguing that the
Lawrence Court’s focus on the history of society’s acceptance of
homosexuals, on prohibiting society’s moral values from trumping
individual liberties, and on disapproving of laws that are based
on animus towards a group, will allow future courts to declare
the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional).
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finding that homosexual conduct is a fundamental right because
the European cases that the Court cites use strict scrutiny to
protect homosexual conduct under a fundamental right to privacy
in the same way that the United States Supreme Court has used
strict scrutiny to protect other liberties as fundamental
rights.122

The Court cited the Wolfenden Report, which advised

the British Parliament to repeal laws that punished homosexual
conduct, and the ensuing Sexual Offences Act of 1967, which
enacted the report’s recommendations.123

122

The Court also cited

See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149,

164 (invalidating a law that prohibited private, homosexual
conduct, providing that the law was not ‘necessary’ to achieving
Northern Ireland’s important interests of protecting certain
sections of society, such as children, and the morality of the
citizenry as a whole).
123

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-573 (citing The Wolfenden

Report as evidence rebutting the Bowers Court finding that
Western civilization and Judeo-Christian moral and ethical
standards condemned homosexual conduct); see also The Wolfenden
Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and
Prostitution (Stein & Day, Inc. 1963) (concluding that outlawing
homosexuality impinged on homosexuals’ civil liberties and that
it was not the law’s job to impose private morality on others);
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European Court of Human Rights cases with similar legal
rationale to U.S. jurisprudence involving fundamental rights
status.124

Specifically, these cases declared laws proscribing

private, homosexual conduct invalid because they invaded
individuals’ rights to privacy and they were not “necessary” to
achieve important government interests.125
Furthermore, in its amicus brief, Amnesty International
urged the Lawrence Court to reject its Bowers holding in the
same way that European courts have done.126

By citing these

Sexual Offenses Act of 1967, c. 60, § 1 (Eng.) (decriminalizing
private homosexual conduct between two consenting adult men).
124

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576 (citing European Court of Human

Rights cases that have protected homosexual adults’ rights to
engage in intimate, consensual conduct).
125

See, e.g., Modinos, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 489 (prohibiting the

government from interfering in the private and family life of
homosexuals because the government’s intrusion is not
‘necessary’ to serve the government’s interests in, “national
security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others”).
126

See Brief of Amici Curiae Amnesty International et al. at 9,
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European Human Rights Court cases, the Court in Lawrence gave
weight to Amnesty International’s argument that decisions to
engage in sexual conduct with members of the same sex are among,
“the most intimate and personal choices a person can make in a
lifetime.”127

By focusing on how European courts treat

homosexual conduct as a fundamental right to privacy, the
Lawrence Court gave credence to the argument that courts should
treat homosexual conduct as a fundamental right and opened the
door for future courts to use Lawrence to create a fundamental
right to private, homosexual conduct.
2. Granting Heightened Scrutiny To Homosexuals’ Equal
Protection Claims
While the courts largely have foreclosed homosexual
employees’ arguments that sexual orientation discrimination is
akin to discrimination on the basis of sex for Title VII
purposes, many courts have granted such claims in areas outside
of Title VII, such as Equal Protection claims involving same sex
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(No. 02-102) (noting how foreign
courts have rejected Bowers’ principles based on a decisional
theory, relational theory, and zonal theory of privacy).
127

Id. at 10 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851) (asserting that

homosexual conduct fits into Casey’s decisional theory of
privacy, which protects persons’ choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy).
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marriage.128

In these cases, the courts have granted same sex

couples heightened scrutiny for their Equal Protection claims.129
If homosexual couples get heightened scrutiny analysis when they
argue that state laws prohibiting same sex marriage violate the
Equal Protection Clause, then homosexual employees should get
heightened scrutiny analysis when they argue that their
employers fired them for being homosexual, thus violating their
Equal Protection rights.130
C.

Congress Should Enact The Employment Non-Discrimination
Act

Congress should enact ENDA because current Federal
legislation, mainly Title VII, neither effectively nor
128

See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) (finding that

a restriction disallowing same-sex couples from applying for a
marriage license constituted a sex-based classification).
129

See id. (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has granted

heightened scrutiny, considering same sex challenges as
classifications based on gender when analyzing Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claims).
130

Compare Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64 (granting same-sex couples

heightened scrutiny when analyzing a law prohibiting same-sex
marriage) with Glover, 20 F. Supp.2d at 1169 (applying a
rational basis test to a homosexual employee’s Equal Protection
claim where his employer fired him for being gay).
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consistently protects both private and public sector employees
from sexual orientation discrimination.131

In effect, ENDA’s

drafters designed ENDA to mimic Title VII so that it would
effectively and consistently protect employees from sexual
orientation discrimination in the same manner that Title VII
protects employees from racial, sexual, religious, and national
origin discrimination.132

While individual states have enacted

their own anti-discrimination legislation, expressly prohibiting
sexual orientation discrimination,133 most states still do not

131

See Taylor Flynn, Transforming The Debate: Why We Need To

Include Transgender Rights In The Struggles For Sex And Sexual
Orientation Equality, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 402 (2001)
(demonstrating inconsistencies with the way that courts treat
Title VII sex discrimination claims because some courts equate
sex with gender and sexual orientation and some do not).
132

See 142 CONG. REC. S9986-01, S9986 (1996) (statement of Sen.

Kennedy) (explaining that ENDA’s drafters modeled it after Title
VII and that their purpose was merely to add sexual orientation
to the list of employment practices that Title VII already
prohibits).
133

See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c (West 2005)

(exemplifying Connecticut’s civil rights statute, which
explicitly prohibits employers from discriminating against
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have such legislation, leaving most homosexual employees
vulnerable.134

While the Senate continually has rejected past

versions of ENDA, a more narrow construction of ENDA, plus the
Court’s reasoning in Lawrence, debunk many opposing Senators’
concerns about ENDA and open the door for Congress to pass
federal legislation prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination in the workplace.135

employees on the basis of sexual orientation).
134

See Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which Prohibit

Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation (listing the states,
cities, and counties that prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in public employment, private employment, public
accommodations, education, housing, credit, and union practices,
along with the relevant source that prohibits the
discrimination), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=217 (last visited Feb. 11,
2005).
135

See S. REP. NO. 107-341, at 39 (discussing the minority view

of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions that ENDA is overly broad and unclear regarding its
effect on individual, constitutional and states’ rights).
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1. Current Federal And State Legislation Neither
Effectively Nor Consistently Protects Employees From
Sexual Orientation Discrimination
New federal legislation, specifically prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in employment, is necessary because
the courts generally do not recognize a cause of action for
discrimination based on sexual orientation under the current
federal legislation of Title VII.136

The courts repeatedly have

held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination or
harassment based on a worker’s sexual preference.137

Most courts

also conclude that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on
the basis of one’s “sex” is different than discrimination on the
basis of one’s “sexual orientation.”138

136

See, e.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods. Inc., 332 F.3d 1058,

1059 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that proof that co-workers
harassed a male employee because they thought he was gay was not
enough to prove discrimination on the basis of sex without
additional evidence linking the bias to sex rather than sexual
orientation).
137

See, e.g., Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35 (denying a homosexual

employee’s Title VII sexual harassment claim because the
harassers based their harassment on the homosexual employee’s
sexual orientation rather than his sex).
138

See id. at 36 (stating that “sex” refers to membership in a
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The courts are also split in characterizing sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination
whereby employers discriminate against a gay male employee for
being too effeminate or against a lesbian female employee for
being too masculine.139

Only a small minority of courts have

been willing to protect homosexual employees under the theory
that sexual stereotyping of homosexuals is discrimination on the
basis of sex and therefore actionable under Title VII.140

class delineated by gender, not sexual orientation).

Most

But see

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79
(noting that Title VII does not bar a claim of sex
discrimination merely because the plaintiff and the defendant
are of the same sex).
139

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250, 235

(1989) (finding that an employer discriminated against a female
employee on the basis of sex, by refusing to promote the
employee because the employer believed she portrayed herself in
a stereotypically male fashion).
140

See, e.g., Smith v. Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004)

(holding that a fire department discriminated against a
transsexual male firefighter on the basis of sex by means of
sexual stereotyping, where the firefighter acted effeminately);
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters. Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th
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courts have been reluctant to extend Title VII to include sexual
orientation as a form of discrimination on the basis of sex,
leaving homosexual employees vulnerable to sexual orientation
discrimination due to inconsistent protection under federal
law.141

The inconsistency with which the courts deal with sexual

orientation discrimination demonstrates the need for Congress to
create specific federal legislation that unequivocally prohibits
employers from discriminating against their employees based on
their employees’ sexual orientation.142
Moreover, while some states have passed their own anti-

Cir. 2001) (upholding a homosexual employee’s Title VII sexual
harassment claim, finding that coworkers who harassed the
homosexual employee for acting too feminine discriminated
against him on the basis of sex).
141

See, e.g., Simonton, 232 F.3d at 36 (defining the issue as

whether the employer offered members of one sex disadvantageous
employment terms and conditions over members of another sex,
rather than offering disadvantageous employment terms and
conditions over members of a certain sexual orientation).
142

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 11 (2001) (arguing that Congress’

failure to enact federal legislation prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination is a tacit endorsement of anti-gay
bias).
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discrimination statutes that expressly prohibit employers from
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, many states
have not.143

Senators opposing ENDA argued that Congress does

not need to be responsible for enacting federal legislation when
the states are enacting their own anti-discrimination
legislation.144

Their concern was that the states that had

prohibited sexual orientation discrimination limited their

143

See Summary Of States Which Prohibit Discrimination Based On

Sexual Orientation (June 24, 2004) (listing California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington D.C., and
Wisconsin as the states that have either civil rights
legislation or executive orders that protect employees from
sexual orientation discrimination), available at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=185 (last modified June 24,
2004).
144

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 39 (2001) (noting how the thirteen

states that enacted laws prohibiting sexual orientation
discrimination at the time had tailored these laws to their own
needs and sensitivities by defining “sexual orientation” in
different ways).
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statutes’ protections to non-criminal activity, whereas ENDA did
not make such a distinction.145

ENDA, being federal law, would

preempt states’ anti-discrimination laws146 and therefore would
have forced employers to employ homosexuals that the states
deemed were engaging in the criminal conduct of sodomy.147

The

Court in Lawrence foreclosed that argument when it
decriminalized all state sodomy statues because ENDA’s
definition of “sexual orientation” no longer conflicts with
states’ definitions of “sexual orientation” regarding the
criminality of private, homosexual conduct.148

145

See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(15) (2004) (narrowing Rhode

Island’s definition of “sexual orientation” to define the status
of a person rather than to render criminal conduct lawful).
146

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (declaring the U.S.

Constitution and federal law to be the supreme law of the land,
notwithstanding state laws to the contrary).
147

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 40 (2001) (arguing that because ENDA

would preempt state law, it should take into account different
states’ definitions of “sexual orientation” by recognizing that
homosexual conduct is criminal behavior under certain state’s
criminal codes).
148

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 39 (2001) (demonstrating that pre-

Lawrence, Senators claimed that ENDA likely would conflict with
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Moreover, while Senators opposing ENDA would have liked to
have left it up to the states to continue enacting their own
legislation, Congress has enacted Federal anti-discrimination
legislation in the past, even when some states had already
prohibited similar discrimination.149

For example, when Congress

enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several states already had
some form of civil rights law prohibiting racial
discrimination.150

Furthermore, Congress passed the Americans

many state laws because ENDA failed to account for the varying
definitions of “sexual orientation” among state laws).
149

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 13 (2001) (noting that Congress

passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because it recognized that a
large number of states offered no protection against racial
discrimination).

But see 151 CONG. REC. S146-01, S365

(2005)(statement by Sen. Allard) (demonstrating Congress’
attempt to limit homosexuals’ rights via the “Marriage
Protection Amendment” which is a constitutional amendment that
defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman).
150

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1945) (exemplifying

New Jersey’s Civil Rights Law that prohibited employers from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race, enacted
prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); accord CONN GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-60 (West 1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19 § 711 (1953)
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with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), even though several states
provided some protection to individuals with disabilities prior
to 1990.151

In passing these two pieces of legislation, Congress

affirmed that civil rights is a matter of national interest and
that Congress is responsible for creating uniform standards to
reinforce the nation’s commitment to equality.152
2. ENDA’s Narrow Drafting And The Court’s Reasoning In
Lawrence Debunk ENDA’s Opposition’s Arguments
Senators opposing ENDA cited concerns that ENDA would force
employers with deeply held religious and moral beliefs, who find
homosexuality morally repugnant, to hire homosexual employees.153
151

See, e.g., WIS.STAT.ANN. § 111.321 (West 1981) (demonstrating

Wisconsin’s Fair Employment Law, enacted 9 years prior to the
federal ADA, that prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of disability).
152

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 13 (2001) (arguing that it is

Congress’s responsibility to create a uniform standard of
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, just
like it was Congress’ responsibility to create a uniform
standard of prohibiting discrimination based on race,
disability, and age).
153

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9991 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (fearing

that ENDA would override millions of Americans’ moral and
religious sensibilities).

56

Before Lawrence, the Court validated this critique by holding
that the Boy Scouts of America, a non-religious group, did not
have to employ a homosexual Scout Master because this
effectively would force the Boy Scouts to send a message that
homosexual conduct is a legitimate form of behavior, when in
fact the Boy Scouts wanted to send the contrary message, namely
that they morally opposed homosexuality.154

The 1996 version of

ENDA exempted only non-profit religious groups, drawing harsh
criticism from opposing Senators who objected to ENDA’s
applicability to for-profit, religious organizations that held
the same moral reprehension to homosexuality as their non-profit
counterparts.155

154

The 2003 version of ENDA is more narrowly

See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)

(legitimizing the Boy Scouts’ concern that a homosexual Scout
Master would be a bad role model).
155

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9997 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing

that a for-profit religious organization, such as a Christian
book store, should not forfeit its right to condemn
homosexuality just because it makes a profit).

But see 142

CONG.REC. at S9986, S10002 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting
that ENDA 1996 provided a broader religious exemption than Title
VII and that ENDA 1996 exempted only nonprofit religious
businesses, consistent with other civil rights laws, because the
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constructed, exempting all religious organizations, regardless
of their profit status, thereby allaying opposing Senators’
previous concerns.156

While the 2003 version of ENDA does not

exempt the Boy Scouts, the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence
rebutted the premise that employers who are morally opposed to
homosexuality may discriminate against homosexual employees
because the Lawrence decision specifically recognized that
society’s moral judgments on homosexuality cannot be a rational
basis for discrimination.157

Additionally, the purpose of civil

drafters considered nonprofit businesses to be more directly
associated with religious teachings while the for-profit
businesses were more secular in nature).
156

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 9 (2003) (defining “religious organization” as, “A) a
religious corporation, association, or society; or B) a school,
college, university, or other educational institution or
institution of learning if, i) the institution is ...
controlled, managed, owned, or supported by a religion,
religious corporation, association, or society; or ii) the
curriculum of the institution is directed toward the propagation
of religion”).
157

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 577-78 (finding that a state’s

traditional view that homosexual conduct is immoral is not a
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rights laws, like Title VII, is to protect the minority and
combat those moral and ethical beliefs against disparaged
classes so that everyone has an equal opportunity in
employment.158

Protecting citizens’ civil rights is a basic

federal duty, and ENDA is a proper response to sexual
orientation discrimination.159
Furthermore, nothing in ENDA protects inappropriate
behavior, whether perpetrated by a homosexual employee or by a
heterosexual employee.160

As with the ADA, a person in the

protected class cannot engage in bizarre behavior, must be

sufficient reason to prohibit it).
158

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9994 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing

that Congress has enacted previous civil rights laws in order to
prohibit employers from using their ethical and moral beliefs as
a basis for discrimination based on race, religion, ethnicity,
national origin, gender, and disability).
159

See 142 CONG.REC. at S10002 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)

(stating that Congress has the duty to set national standard of
fairness and equality so that citizens may travel across the
country without facing unjust discrimination).
160

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9999 (statement of Sen. Feinstein)

(asserting that ENDA does not protect inappropriate conduct,
such as a waiter or waitress kissing on their job).
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qualified for the job, and must abide by workplace rules.161

A

homosexual teacher, publicly engaging in homosexual conduct, is
just as inappropriate as a heterosexual teacher engaging in the
same conduct.162

ENDA treats homosexual employees wearing

inappropriate clothing and accessories the same as heterosexual
employees wearing similarly inappropriate clothing and
accessories.163

Moreover, the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence

prohibits employers from objecting to homosexual conduct as an

161

See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003)

(holding that an employer did not discriminate against an
employee based on disability where the employer fired the
employee for testing positive for cocaine at work, and where the
company had a policy of not rehiring employees whom the employer
terminated for violating workplace rules).
162

See ,e.g., Petit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 889

(Cal. 1973) (finding that a public school properly discharged a
teacher, who went to a “swingers” club with her husband, and
engaged in three separate acts of oral copulation).
163

See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 246-247 (1976)

(upholding a police department’s hair and grooming standards
because they promoted the legitimate government interests of
keeping uniformity in their police departments as well as
promoting esprit de corps).
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objectionable behavior unto itself because the Lawrence Court
constitutionally protects homosexual conduct as a private,
liberty interest, not subject to society’s moral objections.164
Similarly, Senators opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1964
argued that the legislation would force employers to hire black
employees, which many employers morally opposed.165

However, the

Supreme Court consistently has rejected these arguments and
upheld employees’ Title VII racial, religious, sex, and national
origin discrimination claims.166

164

See 539 U.S. 577-78 (stating that individuals’ private,

homosexual conducts deserve the same privacy interests as
married and unmarried individuals’ interests in their intimate
conduct).
165

See 142 CONG.REC. at S10003 (statement of Sen. Kennedy)

(recalling Senators’ arguments that blacks did not deserve
federal protection from discrimination because these Senators
believed that blacks did not work hard, were lazy, and were not
competent).
166

See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

801 (1973) (upholding a black employee’s Title VII racial
discrimination claim, where an employer treated employees of one
race differently than employees of another race); see also
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986)
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Senators should also not use ENDA’s “perception” language
as an excuse to reject ENDA because including this language is
most consistent with Congress’ intent to prevent
discrimination.167

Senators opposing ENDA voiced concerns that

ENDA not only covers discrimination against known homosexual
employees, but also covers discrimination against employees whom
employers and colleagues perceive to be homosexual.168

Some in

Congress fear that this definition would lead to a deluge of
litigation over the definitions of homosexuality and
perception.169

However, ENDA’s “perception” language is

(holding that a woman’s claim of a hostile work environment
constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, and was
therefore actionable under Title VII)
167

See S. REP. NO. 107-341, at 30 (2001) (arguing that by reading

“perception” language into civil rights statutes the courts are
supporting the spirit in which Congress has enacted such
statutes).
168

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 3(a)(9) (2003) (defining “sexual orientation” as,
“homosexuality, bisexuality, or heterosexuality, whether the
orientation is real or perceived”).
169

See S. REP. NO. 107-341, at 39 (2001) (claiming that ENDA will

force employers to settle sexual orientation discrimination
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consistent with similar language in other federal civil rights
legislation, such as the ADA.170

Moreover, many courts have read

“perception” language into Title VII, even though Title VII does
not expressly prohibit discrimination based on the employers’
perceptions.171

For example, courts have interpreted Title VII

to encompass employers who discriminate based on their
perceptions of their employees’ sex by means of sex
stereotyping.172

Furthermore, ENDA’s “perception” language is

consistent with many state anti-discrimination statutes’

claims because the only way for employers to defend themselves
using ENDA’s broad definition of “sexual orientation” is by
proving a negative).
170

See American’s With Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112,

12102(2)(C)(2005) (prohibiting employers from discriminating
against employees whom the employer knows or regards as being
disabled).
171

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (containing the language “because of

such individual’s race ... national origin” and not “perception
of such individual’s race ... national origin”).
172

See, e.g., Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (holding that

discrimination based on the employer’s perception that the
employee is effeminate is discrimination because of sex, and
therefore actionable under Title VII).
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definition of sexual orientation discrimination.173
ENDA’s narrow construction also refutes opposing Senators’
concerns that ENDA will give the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) the power to require employers to provide
the EEOC with data on the sexual orientation of their
employees.174

They argue that in order to defend against sexual

orientation discrimination claims, employers will need to be
able to show that they do in fact hire homosexual employees.175
They claim that the only way employers can show that they hire
homosexual employees is by keeping statistics on the sexual

173

See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2 (2004) (defining

“sexual orientation” as “having or being perceived as having an
orientation for heterosexuality, bisexuality, or
homosexuality”).
174

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9992 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (alleging

that ENDA invites employers to gather statistics based on sexual
orientation because Section 11 of ENDA 1996 grants the EEOC the
same enforcement power as it already has under Title VII).
175

See id. (explaining how the EEOC would require employers to

keep statistics of their employees’ sexual orientations so as to
defend against pattern and practice cases, where the plaintiff
complains that the employer has a policy that discriminates by
failing to hire homosexual employees).
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orientations of their employees and invading their privacy.176
Again, ENDA’s narrow construction refutes these claims by
expressly prohibiting the EEOC from collecting statistics.177
Moreover, the EEOC recordkeeping and reporting requirements
also suggest that the EEOC will not require employers to keep
statistics on the sexual orientation of their employees, and
this lack of a requirement does not preclude those aggrieved by
their employers on the basis of sex, age, or disability from
successfully litigating claims.178

The EEOC’s only reporting

requirement, applicable to private sector employees, is the EEO1 form, which does not request any information regarding

176

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9998 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing

that employers, in order to protect themselves from litigation
under ENDA, will need to inquire and keep records of their
employees’ sexual orientations).
177

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 7 (2003) (prohibiting the EEOC from collecting or
compelling the collection of statistics on sexual orientation
from covered entities).
178

See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.12 (2005) (stating that the EEOC does

not require employers, in general, to keep or make records under
Title VII and the ADA).
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employees’ ages or disabilities.179

It is unlikely that the EEOC

would require employers to gather information regarding their
employees’ sexual orientations on the EEO-1 form because
employers do not need to know their employees’ sexual
orientations in order to comply with ENDA.180

The Uniform

Guidelines on Employee Selection, designed to help employers
create employee selection procedures that comply with Title VII,
also include recordkeeping requirements.181

However, these

guidelines only address issues of disparate impact
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin and therefore would not apply to ENDA, which

179

See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2005) (requiring employers of one

hundred or more employees to file annually a form with the EEOC
that has information about the race, national origin, and gender
of their employees).
180

See 142 CONG.REC. at S10057 (stating that because the EEOC does

not require employers to keep records on the disabilities and
ages of their employees, there is no reason to believe they
would require employers to keep records on the sexual
orientations of their employees).
181

See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (2005) (suggesting that employers keep

records documenting the impact that their employee selection
procedures have on members of Title VII-protected classes).
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specifically excludes disparate impact as a cause of action.182
By barring employees from making disparate impact claims,
which allege that an employer’s facially neutral employment
policy negatively impacts members of a protected class, EDNA
actually further discourages employers from collecting
statistics on their employees’ sexual orientations.183

ENDA’s

narrow focus on disparate treatment claims forces the EEOC and
courts to examine employers’ subjective intents rather than
employers’ general employment practices, thereby eliminating the
employers’ needs to keep statistics to establish their use of
fair employment practices in compliance with ENDA.184

182

See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 (2005) (providing guidance to

employers on how to use tests and other employee selection
procedures so as to comply with Title VII without creating a
disparate impact on Title VII-protected classes); see also
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S. 1705, 108th Cong.
§ 4(f) (2003) (omitting disparate impact as a cause of action).
183

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 4(f) (2003) (stating that employees may only bring suit
on disparate treatment claims).
184

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 26 (2001) (asserting that the

purpose of ENDA is to prohibit intentional discrimination based
on sexual orientation in employment, rather than extending
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Finally, ENDA’s narrow construction allays Senators’ fears
that ENDA will create extra protections for homosexual employees
and reverse discrimination against heterosexual employees.185
ENDA specifically prohibits employers from using quotas to
ensure that they hire proportionate numbers of employees of
every sexual orientation.186

ENDA also prohibits employers from

using affirmative action or other preferential treatment on the
basis of sexual orientation.187

As a result, employers will not

need to know their employees’ or applicants’ sexual orientations

special rights to homosexual employees).
185

See 142 CONG.REC. at S9992 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (alleging

that because ENDA gives Federal courts the same enforcement
power as they hold under Title VII, courts will be obliged to
implement affirmative action or other equitable relief to remedy
where an employer intentionally discriminated against an
employee based on sexual orientation in violation of ENDA).
186

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 8(a)(2003) (prohibiting employers from adopting or
implementing quotas on the basis of sexual orientation).
187

See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th

Cong. § 8(b)(2003) (prohibiting employers from giving
preferential treatment to individuals on the basis of sexual
orientation).
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in order to comply with ENDA because ENDA precludes employers
from taking their employees’ and applicants’ sexual orientations
into account when making hiring and promoting decisions.188
IV. Conclusion
This Comment has discussed the many ways in which Lawrence
will help protect homosexual employees from sexual orientation
discrimination in public employment.

First, the Court’s

decision ultimately shifts the paradigm from a rational basis
test, which strongly favors employers, to a much more diluted
one, which provides greater protection to homosexual
employees.189

Second, the Court’s decision provides a

springboard for a future Court to expressly declare gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals as a suspect class and private,
homosexual conduct as part of a fundamental right to privacy;

188

See S.REP.NO. 107-341, at 13 (2001) (stating ENDA’s drafters’

intentions that ENDA extend Title VII protections to cover
employees’ sexual orientation).
189

See supra part IIIA (arguing that post-Lawrence, courts will

apply much more exacting scrutiny to employers’ rationales that
homosexual employees are unfit for employment as criminals, and
that employing homosexual employees will destroy workplace
unity, compromise public credibility, and pose national security
risks).
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thereby providing homosexual employees with more exacting
scrutiny for their Equal Protection and Due Process claims.190
Finally, the Court’s decision, combined with a narrower drafting
of ENDA, provides a solid foundation for Congress to enact the
long overdue Employment Non-Discrimination Act.191
Once Congress enacts ENDA, homosexual employees will no
longer need to depend solely on a court’s interpretation of
their constitutional rights.

Instead, employers who take

adverse employment actions against their homosexual employees
will automatically trigger ENDA, which will provide federal,
explicit, uniform protections in both the public and private
sectors.192

190

In addition to homosexual employees bringing actions

See supra part IIIB (alleging that the Court’s focus in

Lawrence tacitly recognized private, homosexual conduct as a
fundamental right, even though the Court did not expressly do
so).
191

See supra part IIIC (demonstrating how the Court’s Lawrence

decision plus ENDA’s more narrow drafting, rebuts opposing
Senator’s objections to enacting ENDA).
192

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005) (providing a cause

of action to employees whose employers discriminated against on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin),
with Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2003, S.1705, 108th
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under ENDA, future litigation may also focus on heterosexual
employees and applicants claiming employers gave preferential
treatment to homosexual employees, reading a cause of action
into ENDA’s prohibition of quotas and preferential treatment.
An investigation of Title VII’s legislative history and case law
should provide significant guidance as to what the future of
sexual orientation discrimination will ultimately look like in
post-ENDA jurisprudence.

Cong. § 4(a)(1-2) (2003) (providing a cause of action to
employees whose employers discriminated against on the basis of
sexual orientation).

71

